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Abstract
This paper studies the effect of political variables on the gains obtained by Spanish
regions in periodical bargaining of the intergovernmental financing agreements and on
the regional distribution of discretional earmarked grants over the period 1987-2008.
First, we find that the relationship between gains in transferred revenues and on
regional public debt stocks depends on the period and the specific issues discussed in
the corresponding negotiation, aside from political affinity. Second, we show that the
most discretional program of earmarked grants is strongly driven by electoral strategy.
National incumbents tend to allocate intergovernmental transfers where there are
competitive regional elections. Moreover, we show that earmarked grants are allocated
in those regions where the incumbent performs better in national elections and,
especially, in those where there are more seats to be won. Hence we prove that both
strategies are complementary rather than exclusive.
Key words
Intergovernmental grants, party systems, elections, subcentral public debt.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A growing body of literature argues that intergovernmental grants in fiscal
federalism tend to be allocated according to political interests (Khemani, 2007: 465).
Public agents face important incentives in order to use public investment strategically.
Nevertheless, the disagreement relies on the implemented strategy. A first set of authors
have argued that in districted electoral systems, intergovernmental grants will be
allocated in those regions in which there are more seats apportioned (Gibson et al.,
1999; Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001; Samuels and Snyder, 2001; Rodden, 2002; Hoover
and Pecorino, 2005; Pitlik at al., 2006). Other authors have posited that
intergovernmental grants will be allocated exclusively depending on the presence of the
same party in charge of the subnational unit (Khemani, 2003, 2007). Finally, another
strand of literature has focused on how an electoral race is the central element driving
the levels of government investment, whether it is centered on their own strongholds
(Cox and McCubbins, 1986) or in breaking a tie in a constituency (Lindbeck and
Weibull (1993; Dixit and Londregan, 1996, 1998; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002).
Previous studies have been specially focused on the incentives encouraging
different strategies. However, there still important efforts to be made in two analytical
vectors. First, political strategies dealing with intergovernmental grants require
considering together the interaction of electoral outcomes and institutional context
(León-Alfonso, 2007). Second, the subnational level of competition has received less
attention in comparison to the national one. The focus has been particularly centered on
political affinity among levels of government (Khemani, 2003; 2007) but the role
played by regional elections has not been directly addressed.
Spain provides a perfect case study to deal with these challenges. First, it is an
evolving federation characterized up to now by periodical bargaining on its fiscal
federal framework. The main issue discussed each time is the amount of total revenues
for regions and the criteria to distribute it among those regions. By and large, the main
sources of revenues for regional governments are grants (both unconditional and
conditional) and tax sharings. Second, Spain is one country with substantial variance in
district magnitude across constituencies in national elections (Monroe and Rose, 2002),
so it presents a significant within-country variation in incentives for resource allocation.
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Finally, the case of Spain is puzzling. Despite the theoretical expectations, political
variables have not been proven especially relevant in some pieces of research (LagoPeñas, 2005; Gómez-Reino y Herrero, 2011) or at best there has been mixed evidence in
others (Jarocinska, 2006; León-Alfonso, 2007).
This paper is an effort addressed to integrate the different explanations of
intergovernmental transfers. We focus on two different elements determining resource
allocation: gains of Autonomous Communities (ACs) or regions in the periodical
bargaining of its financing system and the most discretional program of earmarked
grants: investment agreements made by the central government with subnational
entities2.
In this paper we show that no political variables affect the relative regional gains
in bargaining, aside from the impact of public debt in some cases. In particular, only in
the fourth system reform regional public debt stock was positively correlated with the
gains in the financing system. Hence we show that the mechanism linking debt with
higher transfers does not operate automatically and in a universal sense. We also show
that intergovernmental transfers in the case of Spain are driven by the electoral interests
of the national incumbent, but the preferred strategy is different depending on incentives
provided by each level of competition. On the one hand, earmarked grants tend to be
allocated in regions where there is a narrow margin of victory in regional elections,
back-warding the idea of tactical investment centered on swing regions (Dahlberg and
Johansson, 2002). On the other hand, incumbents tend to devote grants in those regions
where they have better results at the national level, especially in those where there are
more seats allocated, so they follow a “take care of your own” strategy (Cox and
McCubbins, 1986; León-Alfonso, 2007). Then, both strategies are followed
simultaneously by a political center interested in maximizing its chances in national
elections and securing as many subnational governments as possible.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the literature on political
use of intergovernmental transfers and public investment is surveyed. The main
hypothesis that has been presented by the literature are discussed and connected with

2

“Convenios de inversion” in Spanish.
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the Spanish case. In section 3 we present the variables used, the specifications and the
econometric methodology. The next section summarizes the empirical results and
discusses their substantive implications. Section 5 concludes.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW
A growing body of political economy literature has been centered on how
incumbents use intergovernmental transfers for strategic purposes. The central idea of
this approach is that political parties and candidates use redistributive policies as an
instrument in order to maximize their electoral results, aside from other normative or
efficiency considerations. This approach involves two assumptions. First, it assumes
that politicians are mainly self-interested rent-seekers and they principally care about
(re) election. Second, it assumes that voters are mainly interested in the private
consumption derived from public policies investment.3 Based on those premises, the
literature has investigated the political determinants driving this strategic use of
transfers.
The first element that has been addressed is the (un)equal territorial distribution
of political representation. According to this argument, Samuels and Snyder (2001)
pointed out that policy agenda can be shaped by the level of malapportionment in the
electoral system. This bias refers to those situations in which there are a mismatch
between the share of legislative seats and the shares of population in a given district or
region. As a consequence, the payoffs in terms of representation are altered depending
on the region and politicians that want to take advantage of it. “In malapportioned
systems, executives may thus face powerful incentives to build policy coalitions based
on the ‘cheap’ support (for example, in terms of pork per vote) of legislators from
overrepresented districts.” (Samuels and Snyder, 2001: 667). Therefore, there are good
reasons for expecting investment and transfers to over-represented districts.
This hypothesis has been addressed in different studies. Porto and Sanguinetti
(2001) analyzed the effect of districts over-representation in Argentina’s Congress in

3

It is important to remind that depending on the author it holds under any circumstance (Cox and
McCubbins, 1987) or it can be balanced by other elements such as partisan orientation (Dahlberg and
Johansson, 2002)
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intergovernmental transfers. They showed that the federal government has tended to
allocate over time important and continuing investments in those districts
overrepresented in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Similar studies have
addressed this hypothesis considering the potential impact of the partisanship variable
(Gibson et al., 1999) but it did not introduce changes concerning the main argument: the
assemblies’ apportionment determines the strategic use of investment and transfers.
Evidence has supported this argument in other contexts. Hoover and Pecorino (2005)
analyzed the impact of disproportional representation in federal expenditures in the
United States. Rodden (2002) followed a similar logic in the study of EU redistribution
among countries and Pitlik at al. (2006) found that malapportionment in the upper
house in Germany leads to disproportional states share of per capita transfers among
länders.
However, this explanation fails to point out the mechanisms driving strategic
allocation in those countries where the apportionment of the legislature is perfect. Does
the incumbent strategic allocation argument no longer hold? The literature has offered
two competing theoretical arguments.
The first model is based on the theoretical background presented by Cox and
McCubbins (1986). They divide voters into three different groups: support voters,
opposition voters and swing voters. According to their conception, electoral politics is
viewed as a two person game in which candidates’ attitude towards risk is the crucial
factor driving the stability of redistributive politics. The authors apply the same logic as
in an investment. They argue that risk-adverse candidates will prefer to invest,
especially in core supporters because they can expect a clear return in terms of electoral
support. On the contrary, candidates’ expectation of electoral support is lower among
swing voters and even lower among opposition groups so they will allocate little
investment in those groups. This strategy is based on the mobilization of the core voters
of a party and has been labeled as “Hold what you got” or “Take care of your own”
(Cox and McCubbins, 1986: 383).
The second theoretical model has deserved more attention explaining strategic
allocation of transfers. This framework is based on papers by Lindbeck and Weibull
(1993), Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1998) and Dahlberg and Johansson (2002). Those
studies are focused on testing the “swing voters” and “core voters” approach to

6
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redistributive politics. For those voters considered as political moderate, those with no
preferences on parties’ manifestos, differences in resource allocation can be decisive in
voting decision. It is the contrary in the case of core voters, who have a stronger party
attachment and to which resource allocation plays little role. Assuming difference in
preferences among the two groups, incumbents will invest resources in districts until
reaching the specific point in which swing voters decide to vote for them. Dahlberg and
Johansson (2002: 30) developed the idea further considering that low income voters
have a higher marginal utility derived from income and thus, they can be persuaded to
vote for the party providing them with more transfers. Then, the idea is to expect low
income regions to receive higher transfers.
According to the density of the investment cut point, under some assumptions
about the distribution4, there will be a correspondence with the closeness of the last
election (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002). Therefore, the hypothesis suggested
according to this argument is the opposite of the previous one. In those districts where
there is higher competitiveness in an electoral contest, the marginal utility of public
investment will also be higher. As a result, swing states will be the primary target of
strategic resource allocation. Studies dealing with this hypothesis have been centered on
those programs fulfilling some conditions: Intergovernmental grants have to be
dependent on the incumbent decision, the investment should be disentangled from
efficiency and equity criteria, resources can be easily connected to an election and
voters can identify if they have (not) been rewarded. The more recent evidence has been
centered on Swedish intergovernmental transfer programs to municipalities, which
fulfill the previous conditions (Johansson, 2003; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002) and
have proven the robustness of the hypothesis.
The study by Boex and Martinez-Vázquez (2005) distinguished several
explanatory models in order to establish the institutional mechanism of grant allocation.
However, they considered different case studies together and found a high consistency
in the role played by political factors driving it. In that which concerns the political
allocation of resources, they stressed the voter choice model; the allocation of
intergovernmental grants will be distributed to local governments in accordance with
the fiscal preferences of the median voter. On the other hand, they also underline the

4

The assumption are symmetry and a single-peakedness distribution.
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important literature centered on institutional elements, especially regarding the
hypothesis that “subnational government with powerful political interests can be
expected to receive larger intergovernmental grants” (Boex and Martinez-Vázquez,
2005: 7). In a similar way, Veiga and Pinho study (2005) showed that specific local
considerations matters. They proved that the longer the time span of the mayor in office,
the more funds are transferred to his/her municipality. They also introduce the relevance
of political timing, pointing out that grants increase in election years.
Therefore, interaction between central and subnational has been also pointed out
as a crucial variable. Literature has suggested that intergovernmental transfers can be
directly related with the incentives that an “opportunistic center” has to guarantee that
his party controls the state government. Khemani (2003) studied the case of Indian
federalism and argued that state governments are key bases in order to secure the
incumbent party support at the national election because states can use instruments such
as patronage in order to boost incumbents´ political support. Therefore “National
governments have political incentives to ensure that their party controls state
governments, for which purpose it attempts to bias the distribution of national resources
to political affiliated states” (Khemani, 2003: 9). This argument has been proven when
Khemani shown that states in India belonging to the same party have higher deficits that
are entirely financed by loans and transfers from the central government. In posterior
research about India, Khemani (2007) proved that intergovernmental transfers are
targeted to a particular type of partisan states. In specific, Khemani pointed out that
“transfers determined by the political agency are greater to those co-partisan states
where the party controls a smaller proportion of districts or seats allotted to the state in
the national legislature” (Khemani, 2007: 466).
The Spanish case offers a perfect case study to test the strategic allocation of
investments and intergovernmental grants for two reasons. The Spanish Constitution
allowed a decentralization of the country which led to the creation of 17 Autonomous
Communities (ACs). Due to historical and political reasons, two opposite financing
systems emerged. Two ACs (the Basque country and Navarre), collect all taxes in their
territories and transfer a part to the central state depending on its service provision. On
the contrary, grants (both unconditional and conditional) and, in a lesser extent, tax
sharing, have been, by and large, the main source of revenues for the remaining 15 ACs.

8
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Agreements on those instruments involve periodical renegotiation and opening up the
possibility of rent-seeking (Lago-Peñas, 2005: 442).
There is a second reason to use Spain as a case study. A number of studies have
been centered on how the electoral system can shape incentives towards public
spending, the size of the government or the levels of redistribution (Persson and
Tabellini, 2003; Boex and Martínez-Vazquez, 2005; Iversen and Soskice, 2006).
However, little attention has been paid to how the electoral system can shape the
allocation of intergovernmental transfers within a given country. According to previous
arguments, the potential electoral gain for national incumbents can have a crucial
mediating effect that could shape the optimal level of resource allocation to “take care
of your own”. This potential electoral revenue is captured by district magnitude. Spain
is one country with important variance in district magnitude across constituencies in
national elections (Monroe and Rose, 2002) and this can make the difference. The idea
is that the marginal utility of intergovernmental transfers can be higher in those regions
in which a higher number of national seats are allocated. Thus, this idea can only be
tested in countries in which there is important variance in district magnitude in the
national electoral system like the case of Spain.
The research dealing with the Autonomous Communities is scarce in general. In
Lago-Peñas (2005) this topic is partially addressed in the discussion of regional debt
bailout. Some evidence suggests that political affinity helps to explain the size of per
capita investment agreements in those regions under the common financing system
during the period between 1992-1996 and the relative gains in the financing system in
1991 (not in 1986). Nevertheless, those results should be considered with caution. The
coefficients are statistically significant at a 10% level, the sample discards temporalseries analysis because it uses averages calculated between 1986-1996, and,
fundamentally, the political affinity variable is roughly measured. It is considered that
an autonomous community has political affinity if, during the period 1986-1996, the
majority of years the party in office has been the same as the national incumbent PSOE.
In the case of investment agreements, Jarocinska (2006) discarded the relevance
of political variables on its distribution over the period 1986-1996. However, in the case
of direct transfers of the central state managed by the Autonomous Communities, she
found that political affinity between regional and national government does not involve

On the Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants in Decentralized Countries

9

more per capita resources. However, it affects voters’ loyalty because the percentage of
“swing voters” is a relevant explanatory factor. The research of Leon-Alfonso (2007)
provides evidence about the relevance of swing voters and partisan affinity. Her main
contribution is centered on pointing out how the relative importance of both
components changes with the institutional design. The lower the decentralization is, the
more important the role played by partisan affinity and the less important the role
played by swing voters. Gomez-Reino and Herrero (2011) change the scope and center
their interest on explaining the annual evolution of the several grant programs to
regions. Despite analyzing different political factors such as the affinity in the party
ruling both levels, electoral margins, legislative agreements of single-minority
governments at the national level with subnational parties or the incumbent electoral
support in ACs, none of them proved to be statistically significant.
Our contribution is threefold. First, the gains in ordinary and regulated resources
in reform moments are analyzed. Second, we estimate more complete specifications
including political and economic mechanisms. Finally, we pay special attention to
econometric methodology, especially to time series dynamics.

3. VARIABLES, DATA, SPECIFICATIONS, AND ECONOMETRIC METHODS
In order to test the systematic influence of the previously mentioned variables on
the Autonomous Communities´ resource distribution, we focus on those instruments in
which their influence should be clearest: Revisions of ordinary ACs´ financing system
and earmarked grants from central administration to regional governments. Insofar as
the dynamics of the former is ruled out by exogenous and common cross-region growth
rates, it makes sense to not focus on the intra-period dynamic.
Therefore, two different endogenous variables will be analyzed. First, the gains
(GAIN) obtained by each of the 15 Autonomous Communities under the common
financing system5 on successive negotiation periods (1986-1991; 1992-1996; 20022008; 2009-2013). Second, the so-called “investment agreements”; earmarked grants
5

The Basque Country and Navarre have their own financing system, bilaterally negotiated between the
central government and each of the regions.
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distributed on a project basis (G). As clarified above, these agreements are the grants
category that can be more discretionally assigned by the central government. The first
variable is expressed in percentages while the second is in Euros per capita.
The explanatory variables considered are the following:
1. The first set of political variables tries to capture the extent to which the
national incumbent is centered on “taking care of your own” (Cox and
McCubbins, 1986). The variable NAT measures the vote share obtained by the
party in national government on each autonomous community. This variable
takes into account national electoral cycle (PSOE until 1996; PP 1996-2004 and
PSOE since then). If it is confirmed that national governments allocate more
intergovernmental transfers in those communities where they do better, the
optimal allocation threshold should be greater in those regions where there are a
higher marginal utility, that is, in those where more seats are allocated.
Therefore, if national votes prove to be statistically significant, we will test the
interaction of NAT and the percentage of seats of the lower chamber “Congreso
de los Diputados” allocated in each Autonomous Community (MG). On the
other hand, the REG variable measures the vote share of the national party in
regional elections. For both NAT and REG variables, lagged values are used in
order to capture the idea that the national incumbent will reward those districts
where it received more votes in previous election. For the same both variables
(NAT-1 and REG-1) the expected coefficient is positive; the national incumbent
will be allocated more transfers where he received more votes.
Third, we introduce in the specification political affinity (POLAF) between
national and subnational incumbents (Khemani, 2003, 2007)6. This variable is
defined in a different way in specifications [1] and [2] presented below. In
specification [1] the variable is coded 1 if there are the same party in national
and subnational government when the agreement is signed and 0 otherwise7. In
6

In the case of coalition governments at the regional level, we consider that there are political affinities if
at least one of its members has the same political colour as the national incumbent.
7
We can include both this variable and individual fixed-effect thanks to the existence of asymmetries in
elections cycles in the different Autonomous Communities. On the contrary, we have to set aside those
variables in the case of the equation for GAIN due to the low within-variation inclusion. We also check to
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the case of investment agreements we adopt more severe criteria. Variable is
coded 1 when the same parties are in both governments during both the passing
and execution phases of the budgetary process. Additionally, we test if political
affinity effect is stronger in electoral years (Veiga and Pinho, 2005).We have
defined an EL variable, which has value 1 in those years where national
elections are held and 0 otherwise. In the econometric specification we include
the interaction of POLAF and EL as well as the constitutive terms of the
interaction in order to avoid biases in the coefficients (Brambor et al, 2006)8.
2. The second set of variables is centered on the extent to which national
incumbents devote their investment efforts in those regions where there are more
swing voters (Lindbeck y Weibull, 1993; Dixit y Londregan, 1996, 1998;
Dahlberg y Johansson, 2002). We have measured regions as swing depending on
the electoral competitiveness according to Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and
using the raw margin of votes between the first and the second party (v1-v2)
(Söderlund et al., 2011). The DISN variable measures the vote share difference
between first and second party at the national level in a given community. The
DISR variable calculates the same difference but centered on the regional arena.
The interpretation of the variables is the reverse of our hypothesis. The higher
this variable is the less competitive is the election in this region and, as
consequence, lower intergovernmental transfers and gains of financing system is
expected.
3. The last set of political variables is related to the electoral gain of territories
receiving transfers. On the one hand, more demographic weight involves more
importance in the national parliament. Figure 1 shows the strong correlation
between population share and seats allocated (Ceuta and Melilla are not
considered). It presents a scatter plot combining both elements, the regression
line and the curve derived from the use of a non-parametric technique (lowess
linear fit). It gives a higher weight to the observations closer to each point.
define the variable in alternative ways, coding 1 in pre-election years and 0 otherwise; and also coding 1
in both electoral and pre-electoral years, and 0 otherwise. Results did not significantly change
8
In the case of the interaction between NAT and MG, the latter is not included as independent regressor
because its within-variation is close o zero and then multicollinearity with individual fixed effects was
extremely high.
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Linear correlation is positive and very strong (r = +0.97). However, this
relationship is not exactly proportional. Less populated regions tend to be overrepresented in the Parliament. This fact is graphically represented by a
regression line starting over the bisectrix of the quadrant and ending below it. 9.
Therefore, more populated territories are more relevant in order to secure the
national incumbent re-election despite the vote/ seat ratio tending to be higher.
In electoral terms, according to the logic of strategic investment in case of
malapportionment, more resources in small territories are allocated. Non
parametric adjustment shows that this logic is not exactly the same in the case of
AC; they have a population of about 6 and 13% of the total caused by the
diversity in the number of provinces. Therefore, we have introduced two extra
variables in the estimates. The variable POPSHARE is defined as the population
share of each autonomous community. Ceuta and Melilla have been excluded.
Basque Country and Navarre are not considered in the specification centered on
explaining the gains of the financing system. The second variable SEATS
measures the relative share of seats of the Congress allocated in each
autonomous community. Ceuta and Melilla have been excluded again.
4. Finally, we have included an economic variable: debt stocks of regional
governments (D). This inclusion is justified according to the literature centered
on bailout to regional governments (Lago-Peñas, 2005). A positive and
statistically significant coefficient would mean that there are implicit bailouts to
those regional governments with more debt. The variable is expressed in
thousands of Euros per capital. We have considered the value at the end of the
previous year to the financing reform or the implementation of the investment
agreements.

9

This territorial proportionality deviation is due to the minimum of two seats per province established by
electoral law. Ceuta and Melilla have one seat each. According to this division, 102 of the 350 seats of the
Congress are fixed by province. The remaining 248 seats are distributed on a provincial basis according to
their population.
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Figure 1: Relationship between population shares and seats.
Aggregated data for regions in 1996
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Sources: INE (www.ine.es), Ministerio del Interior ( http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/) and own
elaboration.

Data sources are the following. Population data have been obtained from the
National Statistics Institute of Spain (www.ine.es). Data on investment agreements are
taken from BADESPE (www.ief.es). Data is available for the period 1986-2001. To
measure the regional gains involved by bargaining on the financing system we rely
upon the estimates by Utrilla (2002) for the reforms driving the periods 1987-1991,
1992-1996 and 2002-2008 and by Bosch (2011) for the period starting in 200910.
Electoral and political data are gathered from the official webpage of the Home
Ministry (http://www.interior.gob.es/) and the several sites from this webpage devoted
to national and regional elections.
Econometric Specifications and methodology
The following three econometric specifications are estimated:

10

In the reform for the period 1997-2001 there were no increases in resources transferred to regions.
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GAINit  t  1  NATit 1   2  POLAFit  3  Dit 1   it
Git   i  t  1  NATt 1   2  NATt 1  MGit  3  REGit 1   4  POLAFit 
 5  ELit  6  EL  POLAFit  7  DISRit  8  DISNit  9  Dit 1   it
FEi     1  POPSHAREi   1  SEATSi  it

[1]

[2]

[3]

In all cases, subindex i and t indicate region and year, respectively, and ε is a whitenoise random error. Individual fixed-effects are included in both specifications [1] and
[2]. Time fixed-effects to account for common shocks are included in specification [3].
In the case of the endogenous variable GAIN, four cross-sections are merged
yielding 60 observations (15*4). Insofar as both time and cross-section dimensions of
the sample are small, the use of specific panel data or time-series cross-section (TSCS)
econometric techniques is discarded. On the contrary, we rely on OLS estimators,
replacing standard residuals by general-form heteroskedasticty robust errors. Finally,
according to the Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test, there are no problems in this
respect. All the estimates are performed using the software Eviews 7.2.
In the case of specification [2] the first step is the analysis of the data generator
process (DGP) of variable G. Hence several unit root tests were performed. One of the
tests assumes the existence of common unit roots (Levin. Lin y Chu). The rest of them
assume the existence of idiosyncratic unit roots (Im, Pesaran y Shin, Fisher-PP, FisherADF). In all cases, intercepts and time trends were included to avoid specification
biases. Results are straightforward. Variable G is I (0) or stationary: p-values were well
below 0.01 in all cases. The straight consequence of this result is that the specification is
formulated with the variables expressed in levels. Both time and individual fixed-effect
are included in the specification. In the first case, it accounts for common shocks. In the
second case, we test for the existence of systematic biases in the allocation of resources
to the different regions11. In this case the extremely low within-variation of both
POPSHARE and SEATS leads to a serious multicollinearity problem with individual
fixed-effects. For this reason, both variables are dropped from the specification, and a
11

Performed formal tests backed up the need of introducing both sorts of fixed-effects.
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second analysis is performed. Residuals are regressed on population shares to check if
both variables are related. This is the logics of specification [3]. In order to deal with
both heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlations in the random error, OLS
standard errors are replaced by PCSE. Concerning autocorrelation, the first order
coefficient was very low, around 0.2 and hence not a concern.
RESULTS
Tables 1 and 2 report the main descriptive statistics for the variables in
specifications [1] and [2].
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables in Equation [1]. Stacked data
GAIN
NAT
POLAF D
Mean
7.27
44.89
0.62
0.53
Median
6.40
44.05
1.00
0.40
Maximum
32.10
60.70
1.00
2.43
Minimum
0.80
22.80
0.00
0.00
Standard Deviation
5.33
7.78
0.49
0.55
Observations
60
60
60
60
Cross sections
15
15
15
15

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables in equations [2] and [3]. Stacked data
G

DISR

DISN

NAT

REG

POLAF

EL

POLAF *EL

POPSHARE

SEATS

D

Mean

14.24

12.45

10.60

41.39

38.44

0.51

0.26

0.099

0.058

9.58

0.39

Median

10.16

12.01

9.20

40.80

39.46

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.040

9.15

0.33

Maximum

131.85

32.73

34.40

58.10

54.28

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.18

15.38

1.62

Minimum

0.006

0.150

0.20

18.00

9.51

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.006

6.32

0.000

Standard Deviation

14.86

7.574

8.11

8.93

10.11

0.50

0.44

0.30

0.049

2.08

0.37

Number of Observations

272

272

272

272

272

272

272

272

272

272

272

Number of cross sections

17

17

17

17

17

17

17

17

17

17

17

Table 3 summarizes the estimates of specification [1]. In the first column none
of the variables are statistically significant at the standard levels despite variable D
being marginally significant. In order to analyze in more detail the effect of this
variable, it is interacted with a set of four dummy variables (T1 to T4). Variable T1 is
coded 1 for observations corresponding to the first reform and 0 otherwise, and so on.
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Results provide interesting evidence. During the eighties, when debt stocks were low,
this variable does not matter at all. This situation changes in the ´90s. The variable
displays a p-value near 10%. In the next decade the effect is statistically significant at a
5% level. The most surprising is the change in the coefficient sign between the third and
fourth reforms. In terms of Spanish GDP, the average autonomic debt was almost the
same in the time of both reforms, but the coefficient is negative in the first case and
positive in the second12. Why is it that in one period that the higher the debt of the
autonomous community, the higher the gains received, while in the second period the
opposite is true?
Table 3: Econometric estimates of equation [1]
Intercept

1.47
(0.26)
0.09
(0.75)
0.06
(0.04)
3.47
(1.52)

NAT-1
POLAF
D-1

8.68
(1.49)
-0.08
(0.65)
1.75
(0.93)

D-1 *T1

33.57
(0.65)
11.75
(1.59)
-5.95**
(2.10)
5.35**
(2.16)
60
0.572

D-1 *T2
D-1 *T3
D-1 *T4
Number of observations
R2

60
0.488

Notes: Estimates include both individual and time fixe-effects. Computed t-statistics are robust to general form
heteroskedasticity. ** means statistical significance at 5% level.

First, reforms of federal financial relationships are based on multilateral
bargaining

between

the

central

government

and

autonomous

communities.

Nevertheless, the demographic and electoral importance of Catalonia and its strong
preference in favor of decentralization made this region the main agent in negotiations.
The financial system reforms have depended to a higher extent on the parliamentary
majorities in the Congress and the extent to which Catalan nationalist parties were
decisive in the support of the national incumbent (Leon-Alfonso, 2008: 218). This
factor was crucial in 2009 negotiations. The national government was a single majority

12

Linear simple correlation between both variables for the reform passed in 2001 is -0.41

On the Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants in Decentralized Countries

17

party in parliament and it depended on the support of Catalan parties´ MPs. Therefore,
the central government was a much weaker player during this period.
Second, until 2001 those Autonomous Communities with more debt were the
ones with higher levels of decentralization and powers, especially those with higher per
capita GDP: the less developed (Galicia and Andalusia) enjoyed higher per capita
budgets thanks to grants from both Spanish and European regional policy (Lago-Peñas,
2005 and 2006). The 2001 financing reform was in the middle of an expansive cycle
and the problems related with the management of deficits, debt and fiscal consolidation
were not a priority. The core of this reform was centered on the transference of health
care systems in 10 AC, which, as was said, were the ones with lower debt stocks (RuizHuerta and Herrero, 2004). The health care system was, in fact, the main element
driving the reform. “Health care financing is one of the main difficulties in the
negotiation of the new model (…) This competence will involve important amounts of
spending, so AC’s are demanding that the national government provides guarantees
enough that health care administration will not be a total disaster. The central
government is in conditions of creating a fund with extra help to cover unplanned
spending” 13.
Nevertheless, in 2009 fiscal consolidation, debt and deficits were the key
concerns. For example, the regional minister of finances from Catalonia argued that the
economic crisis will reduce revenues and will create deficit. Nevertheless: “the
[financing] system reform was necessary because it is structural, permanent, a new
model affecting our income structure. It is a qualitative change. A different thing is the
economic crisis. Even with a better model we still have deficits because it happens
everywhere, even to better financed states”. However the regional minister posited that:
“The entry of 2.150 million of Euros in 2009 thanks to the new financing model will
allow us to have fewer deficits than what we would have had with the other one” 14 .The
fact that those AC with more debt had lower per capita financing allowed a relative
improvement (Bosch, 2011).

13
14

Newspaper “La Vanguardia”. Friday, June 1 2001. p.19.
Newspaper “La Vanguardia”. Sunday, August 9 2009. pp-59-60.
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Definitively, the mechanism linking debt with higher transfers does not seem to
operate automatically and in a universal sense. It depends on the relative importance of
subnational entities’ debt, the relative power of the central government and regions in
debt and the problems or challenges addressed as priorities in each discussion about the
allocation of funds.

Estimates of specification [2] are reported in columns one to four of table 4. In
column 5 the fixed effects estimated in the first column are regressed on variables with
extremely low within-variation. Variables with statistical significance lower than 10%
are EL, DISR and NAT. The variables DISR and NAT show the expected sign. Assuming
that POLAF is included in the interaction, the negative coefficient of EL points out that
regional elections affect negatively the implementation of agreements.
Table 4: Econometric estimates of equations [2] and [3]
Equation

[2]

[2]

[2]

[2]

[3]

Intercept

9.29
(1.52)
0.40*
(1.94)

8.88
(1.49)
0.25*
(1.62)

15.75**
(2.11)
-0.24
(0.79)
0.05**
(2.22)

10.62***
(3.15)

-8.05
(0.88)

2.49
(0.92)
-3.33*
(1.72)
1.53
(0.39)
-0.37***
(3.20)

3.22
(1.14)
-2.89
(1.47)
0.66
(0.18)
-0.33***
(2.96)

2.77
(1.09)
-3.17*
(1.69)
0.91
(0.25)
-0.38***
(3.61)

-0.002
(0.47)

-0.001
(0.28)

-0.001
(0.25)

NAT-1
NAT-1*MG
REG-1
POLAF
EL
EL*POLAF
DISR
DISN
D-1

-0.18
(1.14)
3.08
(1.06)
-3.58*
(1.84)
1.26
(0.35)
-0.29**
(2.24)
-0.08
(0.58)
-0.002
(0.39)

0.03***
(3.03)

POPSHARE

272

272

272

272

9.450
(0.28)
0.8
(0.95)
17

0.476

0.474

0.481

0.480

0.06

SEATS
Number of
observations
R2

Notes: Estimates in columns 1 to 4 include both time and individual fixed-effects and rely on PCSE proposed by
Beck and Katz (1995) to compute t-statistics. *, **, *** means statistical sighnificance at 10%, 5% y 1% levels,
respectively.
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The substantive explanation of EL effect is related with the implementation of
the agreements, which tend to be lower in electoral years contrary to Veiga and Pinho’s
(2005) hypothesis. The interaction of EL and POLAF is not statistically significant so it
means that there is no special investment effort in electoral year in those communities
with the same parties in national and regional governments. The variable measuring the
electoral distance between the first and the second party at the regional level DISR gives
evidence in favor of the strategic investment of national governments in contested
regions. The higher the electoral distance between the principal parties of the regional
election (less competitive election), the lower is the investment in investment
agreements. Therefore, the result is a higher level of investment in those AC where
regional competition is important and the level of public investment can determine the
final outcome of the election. The fact that REG-1 is not statistically significant
confirms this idea.
Nevertheless, the electoral distance of the two main parties at the national level
in a given region does not affect G. On the contrary, the vote share of the party at the
national level NAT-1 has a statistically significant effect, so there is a positive
association of the gains and the results of the party in a given AC. Therefore, at the
national level the preferred strategy is to “take care of your own”. When this variable
interacts in the model with district magnitude it presents a positive and statistically
significant result. This means that national incumbents do not “take care of their own”
to the same extent in all regions but it is strategically determined by the potential seat
gains of each region. The levels of investment will be higher in those regions where the
national incumbents have more electoral support in previous election and have more
seats at stake.
This evidence points out that hypotheses about the strategic use of investment
agreements are complementary; one or the other will be preferred depending on the kind
of election. There exist different optimal investment thresholds depending on the
electoral contest. In the case of regional elections the optimal level of provision depends
on the strategy of maximize the possibilities of changing a swing region irrespective of
the levels of support the national incumbent has. Nevertheless, in national elections the
objective is different because the potential threshold of investment is higher. The
objective is not to change swing regions (which do not affect the final result because
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national constituencies are provinces) but mobilize the national incumbent strongholds
as much as possible, especially those regions where more seats are allocated.
The argument of strategic use of intergovernmental transfers is similar to the one
by Khemani (2007) when he says that, among co-partisan states, the ones in which it is
preferred to invest are those with a lower proportion of seats controlled by the national
incumbent. There is a kind of swing states among those owned by the party. The
argument of our interaction is partially different. In Spain there is an importance
variance in district magnitude (Monroe and Rose, 2002). Therefore, the expected utility
of investment will vary depending on the number of seats allocated. If a “take care of
your own” strategy is assumed, the expected electoral revenue will be higher the more
the seats that AC has. This explains the positive sign of the interactive effect.
Finally, the variables POPSHARE and SEATS are not statistically significant. In
the case of the second one the explanation can be related with the miss-adjustment
between the AC and the district in national elections, the province. SEATS variable
considers the share of MPs per capita of the AC. However, marginal seats linked with
competitiveness (Blais and Lago, 2009) and malapportionment (Samuels and Snyder,
2001) should be calculated at the provincial level. Therefore, it is possible that its
insignificant effect is driven by this problem, impossible to be solved with available
data.

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Political

officials

in

evolving

federations

may be

tempted

to

use

intergovernmental transfers and grants with strategic purposes. However, there is still an
important lack of understanding on the institutional settings driving that behavior and
the preferred tactic. In this paper we have addressed two different policies related with
territorial resource allocation form the center: the gains of the Spanish regions or
Autonomous Communities in the periodical negotiations of their financing system and
the most discretional earmarked grants made by the central government to regional
governments. This paper tests whether political variables related with electoral contest
and their interaction are relevant in explaining their relative assignment across
territories. We have shown that gains in the system of financing are unrelated with
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strategic use. The main factor driving those gains is regional public debt stocks. All in
all the sign and magnitude of its effect depends on more factors, in particular the
specific issues discussed in the inter-territorial negotiation.
However, the situation is quite different in the case of the intergovernmental
transfers. Our argument is that two crucial elements will drive the preferred strategy in
terms of their allocation: the arena of competition and the expected marginal gain. In
regional contests, the national incumbents tend to allocate intergovernmental transfers
in order to break a tie in elections and gain the subnational government. Nevertheless,
the strategy is different in the case of national elections. In this case, the incumbent will
prefer to distribute more money in those regions where it performs better in order to
mobilize their voters but, especially in those regions in which there are more seats to be
won. Then, both strategies are following simultaneously by a center interested in
maximizing its chances in national elections and securing as many subnational
governments as possible.
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